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Abstract:  
Research aims: This study investigates the role of the ethical orientation of 
management in the relationship of asymmetry information and management 
status toward an individual’s decision-making with respect to earnings 
management behaviors.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: This methodology is an experimental method 
with 2x2 between-subject designs. 55 Accounting students from three private 
universities participated in 4 scenarios of cases (permanent and contractual 
management status, high and low asymmetry information) individually. Other 
side, the ethical orientation is measured, relativist and idealist. The Hypothesis 
was analyzed by ANOVA. 
Research findings: The ethical orientation influence managers’ earnings 
management decisions. It can mitigate the influence of asymmetry information 
toward manager earning management decisions.   
Theoretical contribution/ Originality: This research explains that earnings 
management behavior also can be explained by ethical approach, not only by 
using agency theory. Decision-makers will use ethical considerations when they 
are faced by the earnings management practices. 
Practitioner/Policy implication: The results support pro-social theory that ethical 
orientation can influence the decision making when individuals are exposed to 
ethical dilemmas to make earning management. 
Research limitation/Implication: Participants in this study used students, so they 
did not have experience. future studies can use professional participants and 
consider management status in more detail. 
Keywords: Earnings Management; Ethical Orientation; Information Asymmetry; 
Management Status 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Earnings management is considered being management intervention 
towards the financial statements, in the form of accounting policy choices, 
which are permitted in the process of external financial reporting to 
achieve personal goals, thereby reducing the credibility of financial 
statements (Schipper, 1989). Earnings management can be considered as 
a misleading and deceiving act from shareholders (Healy & Wahlen, 1999), 
or as an action that should be carried out by management (Beneish, 2001; 
Demski & Sappingtont, 1987). There are some reasons why company 
managers do earnings management. Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai (2007) 
conducted an international comparative study of investor’s earnings and 
protection management from 1993 to 2003 with a sample of 33 countries  
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including Indonesia. Based on the results of this study, Indonesia is in a group of 
countries with high average earnings management. Besides, the level of investor 
protection in Indonesia is considered relatively low. 
 
Pennino (2002) states that managers are often faced with various dilemmas in decision 
making during the process and evaluation of ethical information. Decision making by 
considering ethical issues is named as ethical decision making such as earning 
management. From an ethical perspective, earnings management actions can be judged 
as an unethical action because it can reduce the accuracy of the financial statements 
that resulted in profit manipulating by the management. Some previous studies have 
shown that the tendency of managers to manage earnings from internal motivation 
(behavior) is influenced by several factors, which are pressure from the affiliates, 
altruistic and speculative motivation (Chen & Tsai, 2010; Hamid, Hashim, & Salleh, 
2012), spirituality at work (Chen & Sheng, 2013), individual attributes (emotional 
intelligence, narcissism, and moral disengagement) (Jones, 2013), ethical orientation 
(Greenfield, Norman, & Wier, 2008; Jooste, 2013), and professional commitment 
(Greenfield et al., 2008).  
  
This study investigated the role of the ethical orientation of managers to mitigate the 
tendency of them making the opportunistic earnings management decision inducing by 
their asymmetry information dan status. This study extended the research concept of 
Greenfield et al., (2008). Based on the prosocial behavior theory, this research proposes 
a manager's ethical orientation will control their behavior in managing earnings cause of 
asymmetry information and their manager status. Thus, The novelty of our study is the 
role of manager’s ethical orientation, i.e., idealistic, based on the prosocial behavior 
theory toward an individual’s decision-making with respect to earnings management 
behaviors. The prosocial behavior theory posits that managers with the idealistic 
orientation will tend to avoid making earning management, which can harm the others, 
rather than relativistic ones.  
 
An individual is considered to be idealistic oriented when faces a moral decision within 
universal moral rules (Douglas, Davidson, & Schwartz, 2001). When individuals dealing 
with an ethical dilemma, they will consider the possible hazards for all parties affected, 
because they focused on human well-being (Greenfield et al., 2008). Conversely, 
individuals who do not depend on universal moral rules when making moral judgments 
will believe that decisions can be ethical when they considered good and bad 
consequences. These individuals are considered as relativistic oriented. This theory is a 
positive form of social behavior, which shows any action taken by someone in providing 
benefit to. Ethical orientation influences the individual’s attitudes and behavior, such as 
software hacking (Chan & Lai, 2011), earnings management practices (Greenfield et al., 
2008; Jooste, 2013), and moral judgment (Marques & Azevedo-Pereira, 2009). others 
(Paulus, 2018).  
 
Ethical judgments in situations of high moral intensity are affected by personal values 
and by environmental variables, such as the professional code of conduct and previous 
ethics instruction (Douglas et al. 2001). Related to asymmetry information, personal 
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position characteristics and individual differences play an important role in income 
management decisions (Elias, 2002). Even though, there is no evidence of differences 
between contract and permanent managers in the decision-making process, for example 
in the control process (Hartmann & Maas, 2010).  
 
Based on the experience of individual professionals operating in this field, it showed that 
the managers who are being contracted are more effective in making profits, assertive, 
and are not interested in playing politics, more focusing on work, and being able to take 
initiative (Feltham & Hughes, 1999). Thus, there are different personalities between 
contracted and permanent managers. However, there is no research examining yet the 
behavior of earnings management for the contract or permanent status of the 
managers. Meanwhile, the idealistic managers showed a lower slack creation behavior 
than the relativistic ones, as Greenfield et al. (2008) found that managers are more 
willing to respond to the situation by increasing their benefits.   
 
Meanwhile, the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) states that asymmetry 
information is a condition in which agents have more information about the company 
and the prospects compared to the principal. Thus, earnings management occurs when 
the internal users (management) know the information about a company is better than 
external parties. This condition provides an opportunity for the agents to use the 
information they know to manipulate financial reporting to maximize their prosperity 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Healy & Wahlen, 1999). However, agency theory does not consider 
the fact that decision making is not only based on personal interests. Thus, this study 
filled this gap by employing the prosocial theory, i.e. ethical orientation as  Greenfield et 
al., ( 2008) stated that there is a relationship between ethical orientation and the 
decision making. The manager as a human being also has ethics that will influence their 
decision making (Noreen, 1988).  
 
This study confirms the role of managers’ ethical orientation based on prosocial theory 
mitigating the willingness of them to make earning management caused by asymmetry 
information, but not management status. Moreover, this study could differentiate that 
the idealistic type of individual’s ethical orientation plays a better role in mitigating 
earning management than the realistic one. This result provided further support for the 
prosocial theory that ethical orientation can influence decision making when individuals 
exposed to ethical dilemmas. This research explains that earnings management behavior 
also can be explained by the ethical approach, not only agency theory. 
 
This research contributes to earnings management behavior and ethical literature by 
examining the role of ethical orientation toward earnings management behavior 
specially inducing by the asymmetry information. The main and interactions effect 
between ethical orientation and the asymmetry information level indicate that ethical 
orientation does play an important role in earnings management behavior. Thus, this 
study provides additional information to the management accounting literature and 
behavioral accounting regarding the earnings management, especially factors which 
influence the practice of earnings management. From a methodological view, this 
research contributes to the use of experimental design to treat the information 
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asymmetry, ethical orientation and earnings management behavior that previously used 
archival data such as the calculation of discretionary accrual transactions (Dechow, 
Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996). 
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Earnings Management 
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). While 
Schipper (1989) defined earning management as E a purposeful intervention in the 
external financial reporting process with the intent to obtaining one private gain. Some 
studies view earnings management as a problem that needs an urgent remedy, while 
others consider it as a purposeful intervention to gain some private benefits (Dechow & 
Skinner, 2000; Schipper, 1989). In this context, Beneish (2001) distinguished between 
opportunistic earnings management (to mislead investors) and informative earnings 
management (to portray a good image to the stockholders about a company's 
performance).  
This study in the context of opportunistic earning management. Earnings information as 
a part of the financial statements is often used as the target of engineering through 
opportunistic management actions to maximize satisfaction but can harm shareholders 
or investors. Management as a company manager has more information about the 
company than the shareholders, so that asymmetry information occurs can enable 
management to practice accounting with profit orientation to achieve a certain 
performance. Agency conflicts that result in opportunistic management will result in a 
false reported profit, thus, it causes the company's value to decrease in the future. 
Management behavior to manage the profits according to their desires is known as 
earnings management. 
These opportunistic actions are carried out by selecting certain accounting policies so 
that the company's profits can be regulated, raised, or lowered according to their 
wishes. Earnings management occurs when the manager chooses the reporting methods 
and inaccurately estimates and reflects the economic conditions of the company. The 
ability of the managers to use their own judgment and discretion in accounting gives 
them the power to choose any allowable accounting method and any estimate in 
accounting method (Dechow & Skinner, 2000). The ways of managing earnings can 
through the use of accruals, income minimization, income maximization and income 
smoothing (Ghazali, Shafie, & Sanusi, 2015). The likelihood of the techniques to be 
chosen as a tool to manage the earnings will depend on the motive of the management.  
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Asymmetry Information 
According to the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) , the agent and principal are 
separated. The separation of agents and principals raises asymmetric information. Both 
agents and principals have interests. Asymmetry information between agents and 
principals where agents have more information about the company's operating activities 
than principals is a basis for opportunistic agents to realize their interests. Agency theory 
assumes that the principal does not have enough information about the agent's 
performance. The agent has more information about self-capacity, work environment, 
the company, and prospects compared to the principal. This causes an imbalance of 
information held by the principal and the agents; hence, this condition is referred to as 
asymmetry information.  
There is an assumption that each party acts to maximize itself, resulting in the agent to 
utilize the asymmetry information to hide some information that is not known by the 
principal. Asymmetry information and the conflict of interest that occur between the 
principal and agents encourage the agents to present information that is not true to the 
principal, especially if the information is related to the measurement of agent 
performance. The existence of asymmetry information between management (agent) 
and the owner (principal) can be an opportunity for the managers to take earnings 
management actions to trick the owners about the company's economic performance. 
The higher the asymmetry information between the manager (agent) and the owner 
(principal), the higher the motivation of the management to conduct earnings 
management actions.  
Asymmetry information conditions will cause irregularities in financial statement 
information that is better known by the manager (agent) than the owner (principal) to 
fulfill their interests. These conditions can mislead users of the report in the decision-
making process if the manager intentionally provides an inaccurate reporting of 
information through financial reports to the users including the principal. Stevens (2002) 
examine the budget gap by distinguishing 3 asymmetry information conditions, namely 
low, medium, and high. The results of this studies show that subordinates in high 
asymmetric information conditions tend to be higher in carrying out budget gaps (Hamid 
et al., 2012; Kaplan, McElroy, Ravenscroft, & Shrader, 2007). Richardson (2000) found 
that the magnitude of information asymmetry affects the magnitude of earnings 
management practiced by managers. When information asymmetry is high, 
stakeholders do not have the necessary information to see through the managed 
earnings. When shareholders have insufficient resources, incentives, or access to 
relevant information to monitor manager's actions, earnings management can also 
occur (Schipper, 1989; Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995). Thus, this study posit that the high 
asymmetry information will induce the manager to do earnings management more than 
the low one. Based on the explanation above, the following research hypothesis is 
formulated: 
H1: Managers with high asymmetry information tends to do earnings management 
compared to managers with low asymmetry information. 
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Management Status 
Management is the part of the company that designs and manages the company's 
operating activities to maximize the value of the company. There are temporary and 
permanent/regular status managers (Galup, Saunders, Nelson, & Cerveny, 1997). 
Feltham and Hughes (1999) define temporary managers as professionals who offer their 
expertise in a limited time. While the permanent/regular manager is a professional who 
offers their expertise over a period that exceeds the temporary manager. Companies 
can use managers who are permanently employed, and managers based on contracts by 
the organization.  
Most companies employ temporary managers for practical reasons, for example when a 
company seeks a temporary replacement for a manager who leaves, or when a manager 
is only tasked with completing a temporary, or recessionary, project, many managers 
leave the company, so the company loses experienced and skilled staff. However, 
nowadays, the position of temporary managers has changed in the functional role of 
providing objective and reliable financial statements, and it is responsible for the control 
systems within an organization, by supporting local decision-making processes and 
providing management information about operations. 
Feltham and Hughes (1999) and Hartmann and Maas (2010) report that temporary 
managers have differences with permanent managers related to work style and 
personality. Besides, Matejka, Dunsing, and Walat (1998) state that management status 
can lead to unexpected behavior, such as creating slack, data misreporting and biasing 
accounting reports. Thus, this study posits that temporary management will have 
different act in earning management than the permanent one. Based on the explanation 
above, the following research hypothesis is formulated: 
H2: There is a difference in the behavior of earnings management between managers 
with temporary contract status compared to managers with permanent/regular status. 
Ethical Orientation 
At one or another time, a person must be involved in voluntary actions intended to help 
or benefit others and sometimes must ask for help from others when it is needed. This 
individual behavior is called prosocial behavior, which includes actions such as 
entertaining, saving, helping, and sharing. Meanwhile, prosocial behavior is all forms of 
positive action given to others without the desire to get rewards for self-interest 
(Forsyth, 2013). Prosocial behavior can be accompanied by psychological and social 
rewards; it means that individuals can benefit in the long run to live in a prosocial 
society (Roessler & Perner, 2015). 
Penner et al. (2005) show that there is convergent evidence that during the year 
children become good in various forms of pro-social activities that are quite 
sophisticated, such as helping, informing, and entertaining. Not only toddlers can do 
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these things, but they also seem to do it regularly and are almost trustworthy. 
Meanwhile, individual ethical orientation will influence business decision making, such 
as the decision to manipulate earnings, i.e. relativist versus idealist. Individuals who tend 
to be more idealistic will decide not to manipulate earnings because they can cause 
harm to others, therefore, they tend to avoid (Forsyth, 2013). While Elias (2002) states 
that an idealistic ethical orientation would also assess earnings management actions as 
unethical actions, reflecting the prosocial behavior. On the other hand, those who tend 
to be relativistic consider the conditions beforehand rather than the potential risks 
resulted and tend to assess earnings management as an ethical act (Greenfield et al., 
2008). 
Forsyth (1980) develops the Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ) to identify an ethical 
orientation, which is described as a continuum with relativistic on one side and idealistic 
on the other. Forsyth (1980) explained that relativists describe individual focus for a set 
of rules or standards, while idealists focus on human well-being. Relativists refer to the 
extent to which an individual rejects universal moral rules that support subjective or 
situational approaches. This implies that individuals with high relativism will have a 
stronger tendency to reject the use of universal moral rules when making decisions, and 
vice versa. Idealism refers to the extent to which a person thinks that morally correct 
actions will always produce the desired results. 
The impact of management status and asymmetry information on earnings 
management can differ between individuals, this is influenced by contextual factors 
inherent in individuals such as gender, personality type, a locus of control, and others. In 
this study, the contextual factors used are ethical orientation, namely relativism, and 
idealism. Greenfield et al., (2008) suggest a significant relationship between an 
individual’s ethical orientation, i.e., relativistic and idealistic, and decision-making, 
earning management. Meanwhile, Douglas and Wier (2000) found that individuals with 
a idealistic ethical orientation were less likely to engage in budgetary slack creation.  
Thus, within inducing the theory of pro-social behavior, this study posits that manager's 
ethical orientation will control their behavior in managing earnings cause of asymmetry 
information and their manager status. Specifically, this study presumes that when the 
manager has idealistic orientation, they will tend to avoid the earning management 
caused by their status or asymmetry information, than the relativism one. Based on this 
explanation, the following hypothesis can be formulated:  
H3a: Earnings management behavior will be higher in managers with relativistic ethical 
orientation and temporary-contract status in comparison with managers with 
permanent status and idealistic ethical orientation. 
H3b: Earnings management behavior will be higher in managers with permanent status 
and relativistic ethical orientation in comparison with managers with temporary status 
and idealistic ethical orientation. 
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H4a: In high asymmetry information conditions, earnings management behavior will be 
higher in managers with relativistic ethical orientation compared to managers with 
idealistic ethical orientation. 
H4b: In low asymmetry information conditions, earnings management behavior will be 
higher in managers with relativistic ethical orientation compared to managers with 
idealistic ethical orientation. 
Research Model 
Asymmetry 
Information
Management Status
Earning 
Management
Ethical orientation
Figure 1 Research Model 
Research Method 
Participants  and check manipulation 
Participants who involve in this study are students majoring in Accounting Department 
who have taken Financial Accounting and Accounting Theory courses. Participants who 
are selected have knew financial accounting and financial reporting, in respect that they 
have a based knowledge in area that mostly  earning management aoccurance. 
Participants are invited by email and voluntarily to take part in this experiment. In total 
of 61 students participated in this study. However, 2 students did not complete the 
experimental instrument and 4 students failed to be manipulated, so the number of final 
participants amounted to 55 people. Manipulation check is to test participants in 
understanding the concepts of asymmetry information and management status. 
Participants are given  questions for each action with alternative answers from 1 to 10. 
Participant answers are considered to have passed manipulation if more than 50% of the 
answers are correct. 
The demographic data of the participants are as follows: male participants as amounted 
as 49.1% and women as amounted as 50.9%. Participants aged 20-22 years amounted to 
52.7%, while 23-24 years was 47.3%. From the analysis of different tests on average, 
there is no difference between men and women in supporting the decision to postpone 
treatment costs. Similarly, for the age of participants, there is no difference in earnings 
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management behavior. This shows that gender and age do not affect earnings 
management decisions. Randomization is done by placing participants in each cell 
randomly without regard to participant demographics. Randomization tests were carried 
out using participants' demographic homogeneity tests. This was done to see that there 
were no differences in the demographic characteristics of the participants on the 
dependent variable. To control the effect of external variables on the dependent 
variable, it is carried out with the F test 
The higher the sample size, the better for the researcher. However, there is a thumb 
sample size by some scholars. For example, experimental methodologies require at least 
15 participants according to Cohen et al. (2007:102), and there should be at least 15 
participants in control and experimental groups for comparison according to Gall et al. 
(1996). These references can be taken by researchers using small sample size. 
Research Design 
This research is experimental. With the 2x2 between-subject experiment design. The 
experimental process is carried out with an experimental laboratory. The experimenter 
distributes experimental material randomly. Case materials are designed to be based on 
paper and pencil and consist of informed consent, demographic data, case sketches, and 
ethical orientation questionnaires. The experimental design is done by manipulating the 
status of management (contract and permanent) and asymmetric information (high and 
low) of the participants. The number of participants for each cell is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 Participants 
Management Status Contract Permanent Total 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Low 13 13 26 
High 13 16 29 
Total 26 29 55 
Experimental Procedure 
Experiments were carried out by using paper and pencil. Because participants come 
from different universities, students are given a briefing on financial accounting through 
working on accounting problems about  income statement to reduce history bias. The 
experimental task was randomized by giving a code number for each experimental 
group. Experimental instruments have been tested on students until participants can 
pass the manipulation check. Experimental tasks are divided randomly so that groups 
can be compared. A case is illustrated with short sentences and pictures, making it 
easier for participants to remember and understand. At the end of the case, the 
participants were asked to answer 2 questions which are used to check participants' 
understanding of the case given. Participants who answered incorrectly were excluded 
from the analysis. In the next session, students were asked to fill out questionnaires 
about the ethical orientation. At the end of the session, a debriefing was carried out to 
explain the purpose and objectives of the experiment. 
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Operationalization of Variables 
Independent Variables; There are three independent variables, asymmetry information, 
management status and ethical orientation.  Those two variables are manipulated. 
Management status is manipulated as a manager with a temporary contract status or 
through a permanent career path. The asymmetry information is manipulated in high 
and low one; and the ethical orientation is the individual belief that considering to be 
right/ethic. This belief divided into relativistic and idealistic ethical orientation was 
measured using a questionnaire. This study adopted the Ethics Position Questionnaire 
(EPQ) developed by Forsyth (1980), to measure the ethical orientation of each 
participant. Questionnaires consisting of 20 questions, 10 each for idealistic and 
relativistic ethical orientation.  
This research used the validity test of a product-moment correlation of 0.76. While the 
reliability test was obtained by Cronbach's alpha reliability scores for 10 idealistic items 
and 10 relativistic items were 0.84 and 0.80. For each participant, the average score of 
10 idealistic question items and 10 relativistic statement items will be calculated. 
Participant classification is included in idealistic and relativistic ethical orientation based 
on the highest average answers. 
Dependent variable: earnings management, in respect of  individual decision to delay 
recognition of maintenance or maintenance costs. The measurement of earning 
management in this study adopted the scenario used by Clikeman and Henning (2000), 
that the respondents were asked to provide support or not the decision, to postpone 
treatment costs. 
Data Analysis Method 
This research used the ANOVA analysis method to test the hypothesis with more 
nominal independent variables at 2 levels. This analysis tool is used because there are 
more than 1 independent variable and nominal scale. Also, the dependent variable in 
this study is the interval scale. ANOVA is also used to test the interaction of independent 
variables and their influence on the dependent variable. There are 3 independent 
variables in this study, namely as asymmetry information, which is categorized as low 
and high; management status which is classified as contract and permanent status; and 
ethical orientation which is classified into idealistic orientation and relativistic 
orientation. 
Result and Discussion 
This study investigated the role of ethical orientation in the relationship between 
asymmetry information, management status, and earnings management. Hypothesis 1 
predicts that managers with high asymmetry information will tend to do earnings 
management compared to managers with low asymmetry information. Table 3 shows 
the results of H1 testing, the main effect of asymmetry information shows the value of F 
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(3,135), P-value = 0.029 (see table 3. High asymmetry information results in an average 
decision to delay maintenance costs by (M = 4,851) compared to low asymmetry 
information (M = 4,167). This shows that there are differences in earnings management 
decisions at high and low levels of asymmetry information. This result supports H1. In 
this study in accordance with previous research, Stevens (2002); Kraft, Lee, and Lopatta 
(2014); Kaplan et al. (2007), and Hamid, Hashim, and Salleh (2012) mention that high 
asymmetry information influences budgetary slack decisions, while this study states that 
high asymmetry influences earnings management behavior. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that there is a difference in earnings management behavior 
between managers with temporary-contract status compared to permanent/ regular 
management status.  Table 3 shows the results of H2 testing, the main effect of 
management status shows the value of F (2,451), P-value = 0,169. Managers with 
temporary-contract status result in an average decision to postpone maintenance costs 
by (M = 4,521) compared to permanent manager status resulting in an average decision 
to delay maintenance costs (M = 4,496). This result does not support H2. This showed 
that there is no difference in the management status that is contractual and permanent 
in supporting delays in maintenance costs. Hence, in a condition when the management 
conducting earnings management, it is not influenced by the status of management 
either permanently or contracted. 
Hypothesis 3a states that earnings management behavior will be higher in managers 
with relativistic ethical-orientation and temporary-contract status in comparison with 
managers with permanent status of idealistic ethical orientation. The test results in table 
3 show that the interaction between management status and ethical orientation results 
in a value of F = 2.128, at the level of p-value = 0.122. In Table 2, it is shown that 
managers with temporary-contract status contract and relativistic ethical orientation 
resulted in an average decision to support a delay in treatment costs of 4,545. While 
managers with permanent status with idealistic ethical orientation resulted in an 
average decision to postpone treatment costs with a mean of 4,400. This shows that 
there is no difference in the decision to postpone treatment costs between temporary-
contract status managers who have a relativistic ethical orientation and managers with 
permanent status with an idealistic ethical orientation so that H3a is not supported. 
Whereas in hypothesis 3b states that the behavior of earnings management will be 
higher in managers with a permanent contract and a relativistic ethical orientation in 
comparison with managers with an idealistic ethical orientation and temporary contract 
status. The test results show that the permanent managers with a relativistic ethical 
orientation produce an average decision to support a delay in treatment costs of 4.667. 
While managers with idealistic ethical orientation contract status of 4,600. There is 
difference but not significant statically in the average decision to postpone treatment 
costs in managers with permanent status and relativistic ethical orientation compared to 
managers with idealistic ethical orientation and temporary contract status, so 
hypothesis 3b is not supported. In Figure 2, it is explained that average earnings 
management is higher in managers with relativistic ethical orientation compared to 
managers with idealistic ethical orientation. This difference does not pay attention to 
the status of management, neither with contract status nor with permanent status. 
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Table 2  Mean of Earnings Management Behavior and Standard Deviation 
 Relativistic Idealistic 
Management Status  Temporary 4.545 (0.575) 4.600 (0.672) 
Permanent 4.667 (0.498) 4.400 (0.743) 
Asymmetry Information Low 4.000 (0.794) 4.333 (0.529) 
High 5.017 (0.654) 4.684 (0.557) 
 
Hypothesis 4a states that in high asymmetry information conditions, earnings 
management behavior will be higher in managers with relativistic ethical orientation 
compared to managers with idealistic ethical orientation. The test results in table 3 
show that the interaction between asymmetry information and ethical orientation 
produces a value of F = 4.269, and P-value = 0.036. In conditions of high asymmetry 
information, managers with a relativistic ethical orientation resulted in an average 
decision to delay maintenance costs by a mean of 5.017 higher than managers with 
idealistic ethical orientation with a mean of 4.684. This indicates that H4a is supported. 
 
Hypothesis 4b states that when the asymmetry information conditions are low, earnings 
management behavior will be higher in managers with relativistic ethical orientation 
compared to managers with idealistic ethical orientation. The test results show the 
opposite result that when the asymmetry information is low, the managers with a 
relativistic ethical orientation produce an average decision to delay maintenance costs 
by a mean of 4,000, lower than managers with idealistic ethical orientation with a mean 
of 4,333. This indicates that H4b is not supported. 
 
Figure 3, it describes the ethical orientation which shows that in managers with idealistic 
ethical orientation, the difference in average earnings management is low when there is 
a condition of low and high asymmetry information. Whereas in the managers with 
relativistic ethical orientation, profit management means the difference is higher 
between high and low asymmetry information conditions. 
 
Table 3 Result ANOVA Test 
Dependent Variable:   Earning Management 
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 6.565a 5 1.313 .260 .933 
Intercept 55.525 1 5.525 7.378 .000 
Management 
Status 
4.008 1 4.208 2.451 .169 
Asymmetry Inf 5.727 1 5.727 5.135 .029 
Ethical Orientation 4.006 1 4.006 1.276 0.00 
Asymmetry * Ethic 4.358 1 4.358 4.269 .036 
Status * Ethic 4.644 1 .644 2.128 .122 
Error 7.144 49 7.144   
Total 81.412 55    
Corrected Total 53.709 54    
a. R Squared = 0.36 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.74) 
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Figure 2 The interaction between Management Status and Ethical Orientation 
 
 
 
Figure 3 The interaction between the Asymmetry Information and Ethical Orientation 
 
This study aims to examine the impact of management status and asymmetry 
information on earnings management decisions. Furthermore, this study examines 
whether individual ethical orientation, relativism, or idealism, influences the relationship 
between management status and asymmetry information toward earnings 
management. Asymmetry information influences the behavior of earnings management. 
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High asymmetry information results in a decision to delay more cost of treatment than 
lower asymmetry information. Based on the agency theory, the opportunistic behavior 
of managers is motivated by an imbalance of information between agents and 
principals.  
 
Management status does not affect earnings management behavior. Although the 
average decision to postpone treatment costs is higher in management with temporary 
contract status than management with permanent status, the difference is not 
significant. It can be concluded that the behavior of earnings management does not pay 
attention to their status as a temporary contract or permanent manager, but it is likely 
to be more driven by economic motives in the form of bonuses or compensation. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study includes the ethical orientation that influences the relationship between the 
asymmetry information and management status to earnings management behavior. The 
test results using ANOVA analysis show that the behavior of earnings management in 
permanent status is higher in a condition of managers with relativistic ethical 
orientation than in idealistic ethical orientation, but these differences are not significant. 
The difference in the behavior of managers' earnings management in idealistic ethical 
orientation is smaller, even though they are in a temporary contract or permanent 
status. Therefore, it can be concluded that the behavior of earnings management is not 
influenced by the interaction of manager status and ethical orientation. 
 
The results of testing the interaction of asymmetry information with ethical orientation 
indicate that in high asymmetry information, earnings management behavior is higher 
for relativistic managers than idealistic managers. Whereas in conditions of low 
asymmetry, average earnings management is higher for idealistic managers than 
relativistic managers. This shows that ethical orientation affects more on high 
asymmetry conditions. Whereas if conditions of asymmetry are low, ethical orientation 
does not affect. It can be concluded that ethical orientation partially affects asymmetry 
information. Based on the pro-social theory, the results of the study indicate that the 
behavior of the earnings management is influenced by the ethical orientation of 
managers depending on the condition of asymmetry information. 
 
These findings explain that earnings management behavior can be explained by an 
ethical approach, not only by using agency theory. Decision-makers will use ethical 
considerations when they face earnings management practices. The results also support 
the pro-social theory that moral reasoning is the basis used for ethical decision making 
when individuals are facing an ethical dilemma. 
 
The theoretical implication of research results is to provide empirical evidence that 
earnings management practices can not only be explained by agency theory but also 
empirically can be explained using the theory of pro-social behavior. The results of the 
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study show that the creation of ethical policies in the field of accounting, especially in 
earnings management policies is influenced by ethical orientation. 
 
This study has several limitations, namely: 1) participants in this study are 
undergraduate students, who may not be able to represent the behavior of managers to 
determine the behavior of earnings management. 2) In classifying the ethical orientation 
of the managers to be relativistic and idealistic using the average questionnaire answers, 
it might result in different classifications if this study uses the median of participants' 
quiz answers. 3) The case sketch used to manipulate the behavior of earnings 
management in this study is the decision to delay maintenance costs. Subsequent 
research can use other case sketches, which may affect different decisions. 
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